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THE EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES ON THE
PRODUCTIVITY OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
CONTRACTORS IN AN ACADEMIC
SUPPORT PROGRAM
Brian Delano Yancey, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1990
The purpose of the research was to evaluate the
effects of accountability procedures on the productivity
of performance managers in an academic support program.
The contractors were responsible for supporting the
academic performance of high-risk students enrolled in a
one-credit-hour self-management course.

The contractors

awarded students points that counted toward their self
management course grade when the students produced as
signments of value in their content courses.

Prior

research had shown that students sometimes performed
poorly in the self-management course and that the con
tractors were often unsuccessful in helping these stu
dents improve their grades.

Consequently, the experi

menter speculated that the amount of time effectively
spent by the contractors to help high-risk students would
increase if a portion of their grades were based on the
grades of the students they supervised.
In Experiments 1 and 2, the performance of the
contractors did not improve systematically when part of
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their grade was based on students' grades.

Although the

contractors had been instructed in appropriate techniques
to use to help the students, the motivational operation
(basing part of the contractor's grade on the grades of
their students) was not sufficient.

In Experiment 3,

contractors were provided with a list of alternatives
that detailed what they should do when a student's grade
was below standard; and the contractors earned points
toward their own grade when they implemented these proce
dures.

This method substantially and systematically

improved the performance of the contractors.

Thus, the

specific description of contractor behaviors plus a
grading system based on points earned for engaging in the
behaviors was sufficient to alter contractor behavior,
suggesting that the deficit in contractor performance was
not motivational but due to a deficit in task specifica
tion.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 1
Educational accountability has been offered as a
means of improving the academic skills of students at all
levels of the American educational system.

It was

spawned by increased concern about the effectiveness of
American schooling.

As Ravitch (1984) notes:

In the spring of 1983, unsuspecting American
citizens woke up one morning to discover
...that we are "a nation at risk"; that other
countries were challenging our leadership in
"commerce, industry, science, and technological
innovation"; and that "a rising tide of medioc
rity" was threatening "our very future as a
Nation and a People." (p. 61)
Originally, the concern about the effectiveness of
American schooling was limited to primary and secondary
education.

But the academic preparedness of students

graduating from colleges and universities also began to
be questioned, as reports on the mediocrity of the Ameri
can college student appeared more frequently in the media
(Bok, 1986).

In summary, the general public assumed that

the intellectual effectiveness of American students had
declined, and that American educators were at least
partly responsible for this decline.
The public's expression of concern about American
schooling provided educational administrators with the
1
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impetus necessary to devise strategies of educational
accountability.

In some cases, it has been argued that

educators are not as competent as they once were or at
least not as effective; hence teacher competency testing
has been proposed as one means of ensuring that educators
have the necessary skills and knowledge to instruct stu
dents ("More Than an Old Refrain," 1986).

In other

cases, it has been suggested that educational accoun
tability is a moral issue and that educators must there
fore take it upon themselves to become more accountable
to the taxpayers for the services that they are providing
to students or for the student's accomplishments (Joel,
1987; Laney, 1987).

Finally, it has been suggested that

merit-pay and performance contracts may properly motivate
educators to improve the academic skills of students
(Cameron, 1985; Miller, 1985) .
At the college and university level, ideas on how to
achieve educational accountability seem to be in keeping
with the merit-pay approach.

It has been argued that

institutions of higher learning should be funded for im
provements in the performance of their students and not
funded merely based on the number of students that attend
them ("Let's Reward Quality," 1985).
But there are other issues related to educational
accountability that extend beyond the performance of the
individual college professor and the particular policies
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related to higher education.
declining enrollments;

These issues include (a)

(b) the changing composition of

students entering universities, and the academic pre
paredness of these students;

(c) the effort required on

the part of professors and university administrators to
improve the skills of under-prepared students; and (d)
the development of a cost-effective technology to improve
the academic skills of the under-prepared student.
Declining Student Enrollment
And Student Attrition

Nationally, declining enrollment and student attri
tion are problems confronting college and university
administrators.

This is because colleges and univer

sities receive less money when fewer students attend
them; but the university is still obligated to provide
essentially the same services.
A sustained reduction in the numbers of students at
tending the university becomes a major problem when it
threatens the loss of current faculty and administrative
positions.

In other words, when enrollment declines to

the point where the university community itself is threa
tened, university administrators may attempt to develop
programs to recruit new students and to retain the stu
dents already at the university.

Perhaps educational

accountability is a useful tool for accomplishing this
latter objective.
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4
Changing Composition of Students
Why has student enrollment declined?
some students performing poorly?

And why are

The decline in the

birth rate since 1958 (Bureau of the Census, 1987) is in
part responsible for the decline in the number of stu
dents attending colleges and universities.

The changing

demographic composition of the student body may be par
tially responsible for the poorer testing and academic
performance of some college students.

To this latter

point, Stone, Spangler, Eller, and Gephart (1979) note:
Students who in former years would not have had
any expectation of entering much less graduat
ing from an institution of higher education are
now being eagerly recruited, most frequently by
publicly funded institutions where budgetary
dollars are based on student body count, (p.
19)
Although it is not clear at the national level that
the performance of students has declined significantly
within the past two decades (Bureau of the Census, 1985),
at particular educational institutions, special assis
tance for the under-prepared student is greatly needed.
For example, at Western Michigan University, blacks
score lower on ACT composite scores than do their white
counterparts.

And the attrition rate for special admis

sion groups (Martin Luther King and Alpha students) is
higher than that of regularly-admitted students (Yancey,
1983).

Moreover, Richardson and Bender (1985) report
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"community colleges are inundated with under-prepared
students.

At Miami Dade, for example, two thirds of all

entering students tested are deficient in reading, writ
ing, or mathematics"

(p. xxii). It can be assumed that at

least some of the non-traditional students do not have
the requisite skills that would enable them to perform
adequately at the university without special assistance.
Therefore, an important question seems to be, "Is educa
tional accountability a viable means of encouraging
university faculty and staff to provide the needed help
for under-prepared students?"
Soliciting Participation In Educational
Accountability Programs

The university functions in a competitive environ
ment.

It, along with other non-profit organizations,

must compete for its share of the tax and donation dollar
(Brethower & Wittkopp,

1987).

Said another way, the

university is accountable to the marketplace for the
outcomes it produces.
Similarly, an effective accountability system at the
university level would require professors to be account
able to university administrators for the performance of
the students enrolled in their courses.

This might mean

that professors would need to change their instructional
practices in order to ensure that the under-prepared
student masters course materials.

However, it can be
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predicted that it would be burdensome for students,
professors, and university administrators to alter their
behaviors in a manner that would result in the improved
performance of under-prepared students.
The Student
It would be burdensome for students who do not have
adequate requisite skills to expend more time studying
course materials than do their more adequately prepared
counterparts.

Furthermore, the under-prepared student

may need to participate in programs designed to help them
acquire the necessary self-management and intellectual
skills.
However, it is commonly believed that the students
who are in the most need of assistance typically do not
spend enough time studying nor do they tend to volunteer
for those programs designed to help them succeed.
The Professor
The traditional role of the college professors as
subject matter experts must be reexamined if they are to
be instrumental in helping under-prepared students suc
ceed at the university.

Traditionally, college profes

sors have been expected to possess a thorough understand
ing of their academic discipline, and to present their
knowledge to the students enrolled in their courses.
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At many universities, professors are not required to
and have not been compensated for presenting the subject
matter in a form that can help the under-prepared student
master course materials.

Instead, where accountability

has been a major issue, the accountability has usually
been in terms of publications, rather than the academic
accomplishment of the professor's students or the im
provement in the academic repertoire of the professor's
students.

It is one thing to have a large number of

bright students at the beginning who already have the
accomplishments, but something else again for a professor
to improve the repertoire of his or her students.
If educational accountability is to be directed
toward helping the under-prepared student, then profes
sors must not only possess a thorough understanding of
their academic discipline, but, in addition, they must
also be familiar with effective instructional methods.
To this end, many professors will need to invest more
time in acquiring the repertoire that will be beneficial
to the under-prepared student.

This will necessarily

mean that professors will need to modify their course
materials and instructional practices so that they do in
fact help these students.
But professors have not found this additional re
sponsibility particularly appealing.

This is because

they now see themselves as being given additional respon
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sibilities for providing under-prepared students with
remedial instruction, without being given additional
support to do this job.

As Stone et al.

(1979) note:

Professors have traditionally been responsible
for: being knowledgeable in their disciplines,
being capable for recognizing and certifying
student competence, and being able to concep
tualize, organize, and communicate the content
of their discipline.
They have not tradition
ally been expected to be salesmen, entertain
ers, or contingency managers whose job it is to
educate masses of ill prepared and/or uninte
rested students. Hidden expectations for such
services without proper institutional support
will not serve as an inexpensive means of pro
ducing the desired results.
If the new breed
of students is to be accommodated and academic
standards are to be preserved, broadly based
acknowledgement of the problem and appropriate
institutional change must take place (p. 21).
The Administrator
With respect to educational accountability, the role
of university administrators must also be reevaluated.
This role may be that of monitoring professors, a respon
sibility that is inherently complex and controversial.
There seem to be two approaches that university ad
ministrators can take with respect to monitoring and dif
ferentially compensating college professors.

First, ad

ministrators can compensate professors for output.

That

is, university administrators may determine that they do
not have sufficient expertise to evaluate the instruct
ional practices of professors.

Consequently, they may

determine that professors should be compensated for an
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increase in the percentage of students who earn adequate
scores on the final exams or national tests.
Another approach may be that of differentially
compensating professors for using demonstrably effective
educational practices.

A major problem with this ap

proach, however, is that it assumes that university
administrators are sufficiently familiar with educational
methods and that they will be able to distinguish when a
professor is in compliance with them.

This approach

further assumes that administrators would be willing to
spend the time necessary to learn instructional methods
sufficiently well as to be able to monitor the perfor
mance of professors.
Although it is not clear whether educational
administrators and professors would participate in pro
grams designed to help the under-prepared student, the
effectiveness of providing added incentives to improve
performance is well documented (Abrams & Jernigan, 1984;
Dempsey, 1983; Jager, 1983; Wittkopp, 1984; Yancey,
1983); hence, the general premise of an accountability
program in an educational setting seems plausible.
But there does not seem to be any research in which
college educators have been differentially compensated
dependent on the progress of their students.

Hence, the

purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the effects of
an accountability system on staff productivity and stu
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dent academic performance.
It was not feasible to use university professors in
this study, so undergraduate students (academic-performance contractors) enrolled in a practicum course were
the participants.

An academic performance contractor, at

least within the context of this series of experiments,
was the person responsible for the academic performance
of high-risk students.

The contractors were enrolled in

a practicum course in the Department of Psychology on the
campus of Western Michigan University, Center for the
Self-Management of Academic Performance, Kalamazoo.

They

met weekly with high-risk students to help them outline
their course materials; and the contractors awarded
points that counted toward students' course grade for
completing assignments of value in their content courses.
The general assumption was that an incentive program
could be implemented that would improve the performance
of contractors, and that this would result in the im
proved performance of the students they supervised.
The question of concern is, "Do academic-performance contractors have sufficient control over the aca
demic performance of students to effect improvements in
their performance?"

It would seem that contractors do

have more control than is readily apparent.

That is, it

is assumed here that contractors can implement procedures
that significantly increase the number of students who
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earn a GPA of 2.0 or above.

But such procedures may

require an increased expenditure of time.

The question

does not seem to be whether contractors have control over
the academic performance of at least some of the students
they supervise, but rather can a set of circumstances be
established in which contractors expend the time neces
sary to produce such improvements?
To answer such questions, research must be done in
which academic-performance contractors are held account
able for the accomplishments of their students and not
just on the degree to which the contractors meet their
job requirements.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Subi ects
The subjects (academic-performance contractors) in
the present experiment were eight undergraduate students
enrolled in a practicum course in psychology.

Their ages

ranged from

19 to 21.

They were recruited by the ex

perimenter.

Their majors were psychology, communica

tions, biomedical science, business, social work, and
education.

Two had been enrolled in the self-management

course as students prior to the semester of the study.
These two contractors had earned a mean grade of 3.83 in
the selfmanagement course.

All of the contractors read

and signed an informed consent form explaining the de
tails of the study and stating that they could withdraw
from the study at anytime upon written notification.
Setting
This study was conducted in the Center for the SelfManagement of Academic Performance in the Department of
Psychology.

The Center was a program designed (a) to
12
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help students on academic probation earn grade point
averages (GPAs) of 2.0 or above,

(b) to help contractors

acquire effective behavior management skills, and (c) to
provide contractors and graduate students with a research
setting.
The strategies used to insure that both students and
academic-performance contractors accomplished the above
objectives were (a) to divide large tasks into smaller
tasks that could be completed more reliably;

(b) require

that contractors and students demonstrate mastery of
course materials; and (c) require that assignments be
monitored weekly, as a means of providing behavioral
consequences more regularly than would normally be the
case.
In addition, the students enrolled in the Center
were required to study eight-hours a week in a study
center where they were responsible for producing assign
ments of value in each of their other courses.

Experi

ments 2 and 3 were conducted in the same setting.
Procedure
Independent Variables
Contracting Meeting.

The academic-performance con

tractors were required to meet weekly with each student
(see Appendix A ) .

At this meeting, contractors helped

students specify proofs of accomplishment for assignments
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given in each of their other classes.

At the next meet

ing, the contractors awarded students points toward their
grade in the Center for having completed these assign
ments .
In addition, the contractors along with their stu
dents reviewed a performance-log (see Appendix B for a
more detailed description of the materials and Appendix C
for the materials themselves).

When appropriate, the

contractor required students to complete small components
of these larger assignments and present the proofs of
accomplishment at the next weekly meeting.
The academic-performance contractors used a phone
log and a general-log to document the amount of effort
they expended to help their students.

Contractors were

required to complete the phone log and the general-log if
they had implemented a special procedure or if they had
called a student about an issue relevant to the student's
academic performance.

The phone logs and general-logs

were reviewed weekly by the experimenter.
At the meeting with the experimenter, the contrac
tors were required to have their monitor forms, generallogs, and phone logs.

They earned points that counted

toward their course grade for meeting with each of their
students and for having these forms at the meeting.
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Experimental Design
First-Half of the Semester.

During the first-half

of the semester, 25% of the Group 1 contractors' grades
were based on the average of all of the students he was
assigned.

In other words, 75% of his grade was based on

completing standard tasks, i.e., contracting with stu
dents and bringing the appropriate forms to the meeting
with the experimenter.

But, in addition, 25% of his

grade was based on the performance of the students.
The formula for calculating the contractor's grade
was to multiply the percentage of points contractors
earned for fulfilling their contracting responsibilities
by .75, and then adding this product to .25 times the
mean weekly grade of the students.

(See Appendix A for

the method of assigning letter grades.)
The Group 2 academic performance contractors' grades
during the first-half of the semester were based only on
the percentage of standard points they earned.
Second-Half of the Semester.

During the second-half

of the semester, 25% of the Group 2 contractors' grades
were based on the average grade of the students he super
vised.

And the Group 1 contractors' grade was based only

on the number of standard points they earned.
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Dependent Variables
Average Number of Phone Calls.

Each time a con

tractor called a student or professor, he or she was re
quired to record this information on the phone log.
Average Number of Special Procedures Implemented.
Each time a contractor implemented a special procedure,
he or she was required to record this information on the
general-log.
Student Grades in Center.

The students earned

grades for fulfilling the requirements of the Center.
These grades were computed weekly and posted on a hall board outside the main office.
The Percentage of Contracting Meetings Held.

The

percentage of contracting meetings held between contrac
tors and students was recorded weekly by the experi
menter .
Average Number of Points Removed From Contract. The
experimenter recorded the number of points each contrac
tor removed from student contracts when students failed
to complete required tasks.

This was done in order to

determine whether or not contractors in the account
ability condition would remove fewer points from student
contractors in order to increase student grades.
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Average Number of Bonus-Points Awarded.

The experi

menter recorded the nu m b e r of bonus-points each contrac
tor awarded to a student for completing additional con
tracting tasks.

This was done in order to determine

whether contractors in the accountability condition would
award students more bonus-points in order to increase
student grades.
Contingency for Failure to Participate
If a contractor did not wish to participate in the
present experiment, the accountability condition would be
in effect throughout the duration of the experiment for
that contractor.

It should be noted that the accounta

bility procedure was the standard policy in the Center.
Therefore, the study removed contractors from being
responsible to the experimenter for their students for
seven weeks.

All of the contractors chose to participate

in the study.
Removal of Student from Case Load
At the end of the sixth week, academic-performance
contractors could request to have a student removed from
the caseloads.

Upon the contractor's request, a meeting

would be scheduled with the contractor, the experimenter
and the experimenter's faculty advisor.

The contractor

was required to bring to this meeting his or her phone
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logs and general-logs.

The faculty advisor, after re

viewing this information, would determine whether or not
the contractor had done all that could have been done to
help the student improve his or her grades in the Center.
If the faculty advisor agreed that no more could be done
to help this particular student, the contractor's grade
would not be affected by this student's performance.
None of the

contractors requested that a student be

removed from their caseload.
Orientation Session
All course procedures were reviewed in the contrac
tor orientation session that was given during the first
week of the semester.

The participants were trained on

how to contract with clients, on how to record data, and
of all experimental procedures.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The data in Table 1 show differences between Group 1
and Group 2 during the first-half of the semester.

These

differences suggest that the accountability condition was
effective.

When the contractors in Group 1 were in the

accountability phase, they consistently outperformed
Group 2, except with regard to the average number of
phone calls made (see Table 1).

(The overall student

summary data are representative of the individual break
down of grades in each of the three ranges. See Appendix
D For details).

However, when the accountability condi

tion reversed, Group 2 still failed to outperform Group 1
(see

Table 2).

(And, again, the overall student summary

data are representative of the individual breakdown of
grades according to ranges. See Appendix D for details.)
Contractors implemented five types of special procedures.
Group 1 implemented more types of special procedures and
also a greater number of them (see Table 3).

19
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Table 1
Contractor and student Performance for the
First-H alf of the Semester
(Experiment 1)
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION C alls

Mean
Percent Mean Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 1 0.383
Accountability

0.194

70.297

6.777

2.580

87.13

Group 2
0.689 0.048
N o-accountability

58.332

2.895

1.890

72.63

Note:

The data represent weeklv averaaes per contractor
Table 2
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second--Half of the Semester
(Experiment 1)

Percent Mean Mean
Mean Mean
Meetings Bonus Points Student
GROUP/
Phone Special
Points Removed Pet.
CONDITION C alls Procedures Held
Group 2 0.167
Accountability

0.033

58.332

3.763

0.500

58.08

Group 1 0.143
0.036
No-accountability

81.607

6.000

1.071

83.57

Note:

The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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T ab le 3

The Number of Special Procedures
Implemented Per Category
(Experiment 1)
First-H alf of
Second-Half of
of the Semester the Semester

Intervention/
Weeks
Condition 1 2
Home v is it s to Group 1 0
students
Group 2 0

Group 1 0
Group 2 0

Student
Group 1
Group 2
d aily
accomplishments

5 6 7

B 9

10 11

1 0
0 0

0
0

1 0
0 0

0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0

0 0
1 1

0
0

1 0
0 0

0 0
0 0

1 0
0 0

0 0
0 0

0
0

1 0
0 0

2 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 2

Helped student Group 1 0 0
with homework Group 2 0 0
Letter mailed
to student

3 4

0
0

0
0

0 0 0
0 0 0

0
0

1 0
0 0

0
0

0
0

0
0

Helped student Group 1 0
with personal Group 2 0
problems

0 0 0
0 0 0

1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

0
0

Left messages
for students

Group 1 0 0
Group 2 0 0

2 4 0
1 0 0

0
0

0 3 0
0 0 0
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
This experiment provides some evidence that account
ability procedures might work, but the failure of Group 2
when it was under the accountability condition to outper
form Group 1 when it was under the no-accountability
condition brings the value of the accountability proce
dures into question.

This failure does not mean that

accountability did not work, but it makes it somewhat
questionable with regard to this population of academicperformance contractors under these conditions.

A

possible explanation for the failure of Group 2 when it
was under the accountability condition to outperform
Group 1 when it was under the no-accountability condition
is that the order in which the accountability condition
was delivered could have had an impact on subsequent
performance; that is, Group 2 might have outperformed
Group 1 if Group 2 had been under the accountability
condition first.

In other words, there may have been a

sequence effect.

This is because, by the middle of the

semester, it may have been more difficult for Group 2 to
establish a relationship with the students they had not
been meeting regularly.

Thus, the contractors as well as
22
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the students they supervised may have already established
a schedule that made it difficult for them to hold regu
lar contracting meetings. Conversely, the contractors
exposed to the accountability condition during the firsthalf of the semester may have established a relationship
with their students that made it "undiplomatic" for the
contractor to no longer meet with them.
However, the major reason for conducting this ex
periment was to design an accountability program that
would cause contractors to be accountable for the poorerperforming students, regardless of other extraneous
variables.

But the performance of the contractors relev

ant to the poorer-performing students did not seem to be
affected by the accountability contingency when it was
introduced for Group 2. Possibly this is because the
grades of students who were performing well and the
grades of the students who were performing poorly were
averaged, resulting in a combined average that did not
reduce the contractor's grade significantly.

Further

more, it was probably less burdensome for the contractors
to improve the grades of the students already performing
well in the Center.

This is because these students

probably had better social skills, were more amenable to
advice, were more responsive to interventions by the
contractor, and were more concerned about their own
performance in the Center.

Thus, this immediate conse-
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quence might have overpowered any possible effect of the
delayed consequences of the grade.
Finally, it can be argued that the contractors in
Group 1 were more concerned about the welfare of the
students they supervised than were the contractors in
Group 2, and that Group 1 outperformed Group 2 because of
this difference in the level of caring.

There is no

evidence to support this argument but it is, at least, a
possibility.

For the above reasons, the major alteration

in Experiment 2 was to make the incentive condition more
responsive to the poorer-performing students.
Methodological Issues
There were no reliability checks in Experiment 1;
therefore, the experimenter did not verify that the con
tractors were fulfilling their job responsibilities with
respect to the holding of contracting meetings nor did
the experimenter verify that the contractors had actually
called students or implemented special procedures as they
had reported.

However, the low reported levels of these

last two items and the consistency across the semester of
the data on contracting meetings suggests that the lack
of reliability checks had no systematic effects on the
outcome.

I
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CHAPTER V

INTRODUCTION 2
Initially, it was surprising that the Group 2 aca
demic-performance contractors in Experiment 1 did not
significantly improve their performance when exposed to
the accountability condition.

This was surprising be

cause it seemed reasonable that the contractors would
work harder to help the poorer-performing students if
these students could lower their own grade.
In Experiment 1, the academic-performance contrac
tors were differentially compensated when the performance
of their students improved; this arrangement of incen
tives constituted a group contingency.

However, Emmert

(1978) provides evidence that more dramatic performance
improvements can be achieved when the subjects are given
both group and individual feedback.

Therefore, Experi

ment 2 was changed so that each student whose self-man
agement course grade fell below 72% would directly lower
the contractor's grade.

Experiment 2 also controlled for

sequence effects by altering the design so that each con
tractor was exposed to the accountability and control
conditions together.

Furthermore, a strategy was begun

to get reliability data.
25
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CHAPTER VI

EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Subi ects

The academic-performance contractors in Experiment 2
were nine undergraduate students enrolled in a practicum
course in psychology.

Their ages ranged from 21 to 23.

The procedures for selecting contractors were essentially
the same as those presented in Experiment 1.

Two of the

contractors who participated in Experiment 2 also par
ticipated in Experiment 1.

All of the contractors read

and signed informed consent forms, explaining the details
of the study and stating that they could withdraw from
the study at any time upon written notification.

Procedure
Experimental Design
Reliability.

Reliability checks were conducted six

times during the semester on six different contractors.
The performance of the contractors was evaluated by the
experimenter's assistant.

Several behavioral charac

teristics were listed and the assistant rated the con26
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tractor's performance on a 5-10 point scale, where 1 (or
2) equaled very poor and 5 (or 10) equaled excellent (See
Appendix E ) .

The contractors earned points toward their

course grade for the extent to which they fulfilled their
responsibilities.

A contractor could earn a total of 50

points if his or her meeting were monitored.
Random Assignments.

The students were randomly as

signed to the nine academic-performance contractors and
the order in which students could affect the contractor's
grade was randomly assigned.
Independent Variables
Grading System for Contractors.

Each contractor's

grade was lowered by 7% for each student whose self
management course grade fell below 72%.

However, only

three of the seven students assigned to each contractor
affected the contractor's grade during the first-half of
the semester.

During the second-half of the semester,

the original three students' self-management course
grades did not affect the contractor's grade; and each of
the other three students could lower the contractor's
grade by 7%.
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CHAPTER VII
RESULTS
Terms
Recall that each contractor had one group of three
students whose academic performance could affect his or
her grades during weeks 1 through 7 (Student Group 1),
but not during weeks 8 through 14.

Each contractor also

had a second group of students for whom those conditions
were reversed; that is, another group of three students
could affect the contractor's grade during weeks 8
through 14 (Student Group 2).

In addition, each contrac

tor had a single student who could never affect the
contractor's grades, the permanent control student (St
udent Group 3).
Reliability
Contractors earned 72% of the total number of points
possible.

It should be noted also that it is possible

that the contractors were performing even more poorly
when their meetings were not monitored.
There were no categories or ranges in which working
with the students associated with an accountability
condition consistently improved the performance of the
28
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contractor. They did not work any more vigorously with
Student Group 1 when associated with the accountability
condition than they did with Student Groups 2 and 3 (see
Table 4; see Appendix F for details.)

Even when the

accountability condition reversed, the students in Group
2 did not differentially improve the performance of the
contractors when under the accountability condition
relative to that of Student Groups 1 and 3 (see Tables
5).

(See Appendix F for data broken down according to

ranges).

Furthermore, the differences between the three

groups was minimal with respect to the types and the
number of special procedures implemented (See Table 6).
Table 4
C ontractor and Student Performance fo r th e
F ir s t-H a lf o f th e Sem ester
(Experiment 2)

Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION C a lls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
S p ecia l
Meetings Bonus P o in ts Student
Procedures Held
P o in ts Removed P et.

Student 0.457
Group 1
(A cco u n ta b ility )

0.101

56.52

2.500

4.769

82.92

Student 0.4 3 8
0.118
Group 2
(N o -a c c o u n ta b ility )

59.03

3.764

2.470

82.43

Student 0.463
0.148
Group 3
(N o -a cco u n ta b ility )

66.67

1.805

4.166

87.41

N ote:

Data rep resen t weekly averages per co n tra cto r
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T ab le 5

Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of the Semester
(Experiment 2)

Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION C alls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Student
0.161
Group 2
(Accountability)

0.107

60.71

4.116 3.088

82.77

Student
0.155 0.124
Group 1
(N o-accountability)

60.87

5.346 6.020

83.94

Student
0.175 0.048
Group 3
(N o-accountability)

58.73

4.864 2.162

68.73

Note;

The data represent weekly averages per contractor
Table 6
The Number o f Special Procedures
Implemented Via Category
(Experiment 2)

First-H alf o f
the Semester

Second-Half of
the Semester

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Home v i s i t s to Group 1
students
Group 2
Group 3

0 0 0 2 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0

1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Helped student Group 1
with homework Group 2
Group 3

0 0 0 1 0 1 3
0 0 0 0 2 0 3
0 0 1 0 0 1 0

2 2 3 2
1 3 2 2
1 0 0 0

Left messages
for students

0 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
0 2 4 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Intervention/
Weeks

Condition

Group 1
Group 2
Group 3

2 1 2
4 2 1
1 0 0
1
0
0
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CHAPTER VIII

DISCUSSION
The accountability condition did not produce a
consistent increase in the amount of effort academicperformance contractors expended to help poorer-perform
ing students, even when the poor-performance of these
students lowered the contractor's course grades (See
Appendix G ) .

But it should be pointed out that the

student performance data in Experiment 2 were higher than
the student performance data from Experiment 1.
One approach to improving the effectiveness of the
accountability condition would be to base all of the con
tractor's grade on the performance of the students that
he or she supervises.

This may indeed increase the

effectiveness of the accountability condition, but it
might also make staff recruitment difficult and generate
public-relations problems.

Therefore, this approach was

not considered to be of practical value.

And for this

reason, it was theorized that establishing high levels of
performance by the contractors must be approached in a
different way.

31
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Methodological Issues
It should be noted that the method of obtaining
reliability measures was in error in Experiment 2.

The

academic-performance contractors were responsible for
recording their own data.

And because points were made

contingent on the contractor performing properly only
when the reliability observer was present, that could
affect the performance of the contractor as a subject.
So there are two problems:

First, the accountability

procedure was an obtrusive measure of reliability and,
second, the change in the contingencies in the presence
of the reliability observer may have affected the perfor
mance being recorded, even though this change in contin
gency did not necessarily affect the reliability of that
recording.
On a related issue, the experimenter did not deter
mine whether the academic-performance contractors had
actually made the phone calls to their students as they
had said.

Similarly, he did not determine whether or not

the contractors had implemented the special procedures.
Therefore, the major alterations in Experiment 3 were
that the reliability procedures were improved further and
procedures were devised to consistently increase the
contractor's effort with regard to helping the students
succeed.
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CHAPTER IX
INTRODUCTION 3
The major changes in Experiment 3 were that incen
tives for the contractors were made contingent on the
contractor's using prescribed educational processes,
rather than contingent simply on the performance of the
students.

In other words, this is a move from a model of

accountability in terms of outcome to incentives based on
the extent to which contractors use the prescribed educa
tional processes.

Hence, in Experiment 3, contractors

were no longer accountable for the performance of their
students; instead, they were given a list of options
specifying behaviors that they were required to engage in
when the performance of a student was unsatisfactory.
And the contractors would lose points that count toward
their own course grade when they failed to implement one
or more of these options when needed.

33
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CHAPTER X
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Subjects
The academic-performance contractors in the Experi
ment 3 were four undergraduate students enrolled in a
practicum course in psychology.
19 to 24.

Their ages ranged from

Two of the contractors had participated in

Experiment 2 (these were not the same two contractors who
participated in Experiment 1). All of the contractors
read and signed an informed consent form, explaining the
details of the study and stating that they could withdraw
from the study at any time upon written notification.
Procedure
Experimental Design
Reliability.

Each contractor was monitored an

average of 6.4 times during the semester.

The experi

menter's assistant monitored the performance of the
contractors while they were in their meetings.

The

contractors fulfilled 89.7% of their responsibilities.
The phone logs and general-logs were altered slight34
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ly in order to get a better measure of reliability.

A

row was added to both of these forms, in which students
were to sign their names, indicating that the contractor
had actually called them or had implemented a special
procedure (see Appendix H ) .
In addition to requiring student signatures, begin
ning on week nine, the experimenter called on students to
determine if the contractors had actually done what they
had reported.

In all cases, the students reported that

the contractors had done what was recorded on the phone
log and general-log.
Independent Variables
Grading System for Incentive Condition.

Academic-

performance contractors could earn 100 points each week
for fulfilling their responsibilities as they related to:
(a) contracting with their students,
study center,

(b) monitoring the

(c) meeting with their supervisor, and (d)

attending staff meetings.
But in addition to these points, contractors were
eventually required to earn an additional 25 points for
"special" procedures designed to help their students.

It

should be noted that these special points were not bonuspoints, but were included in the contractor's point
totals.

Special procedures included helping a student

with his or her homework or requiring that the student
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make daily contracts (See Appendix I ) .
Each procedure was associated with a point value.
The academic-performance contractors were not required to
implement the same procedure every week, but they were
required to earn 25 points in the special procedures sec
tion.

Contractors recorded their special procedures on

the general-log.
Grading System for No Incentive Condition.

During

the no incentive condition, the academic-performance
contractors were required to earn 100 points each week,
but were not required to earn 25% of them by implementing
special procedures.
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CHAPTER XI

RESULTS
The results of Experiment 3 indicate that the di
rected effort expended by academic-performance contrac
tors can be increased.
The incentive condition increased the performance of
the contractors.

During weeks 1 through 7, none of the

contractors implemented special procedures. However,
during weeks 8 through 14, 3 of the 4 contractors imple
mented special procedures every week and one contractor
implemented special procedures on weeks 8, 9, 12 and 13.
Note that the academic-performance contractors were
implementing special procedures with students who were
above 80% during weeks 8 and 9.

It was necessary, there

fore, for the experimenter to remind the contractors that
they would not receive their points if they did not
implement special procedures with those students who were
below 80%.
Figure 2 shows the average grade of the students on
which special procedures were implemented.

Note that the

contractors began to implement special procedures with
students earning below 80% when the additional prompt was
provided.

The contractors implemented two types of
37
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special procedures.

The contractor's implemented fewer

types of special procedures in Experiment 3 than did
contractors in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 7).

Table 7
The Number o f Special Procedures
Implemented Via Category
(Experiment 3)

Baseline

Treatment

Reminder

Intervention/Weeks

12 3 4 5 6 7

8 9

Data analyzed

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0

0

0 0 00

Met Program
Director

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0

0

0 0 00

Research on
problem obtained

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0

0

0 0 0 0

Students v is ite d
at home

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(1 )( 1 >

0

0 0 0 0

Student helped
with homework

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(3)(3)

3

3 4

4 4

Letter mailed
to student

0 0 00 0 0 0

0 0

0

0 0

0 0

Student reported
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
daily accomplishments

0 0

0

0 0

0 0

Student reminded
of obligations in
novel settin g

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0

0

0 0

0 0

Student helped
with personal
problems

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0

0

0 0

0 0

Note;

10 11 12 13 14

( ) = Students who earned above 80% for which
contractors implemented special procedures.
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CHAPTER XII

DISCUSSION
This study demonstrated that the effort expended by
academic-performance contractors can be increased with
incentives and instructions.

Experiment 3 is different

from that of the other two in that the contractors were
provided with incentives and a list of options to engage
in if their students performed poorly.

This list of

options seemed to be a necessary ingredient in order to
improve the performance of these contractors in this
context.
But, in the prior two experiments, it should not be
concluded that the academic-performance contractors did
not know what they were supposed to do, because in Ex
periments 1 and 2, each week the program director offered
suggestions to contractors about how they could improve
the performance of their students.

And, in view of the

verbal reactions of the contractors, it seemed likely
that they agreed that these suggestions should be imple
mented.

Furthermore, the performance contractors were

probably motivated to act upon the suggestions, in the
sense that points toward their own course were effective
incentives, as evidenced by their continued participa40
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tion.
But the problem could have been that the incentives
were indirectly conditional on behavior. Rules describing
this sort of contingency, e.g., "I better do something
now to improve my student's grade so that my own will not
be lowered," often failed to control the behavior of the
academic performance contractor, even though the contrac
tor knew the rule and appeared to know what to do.
To clarify this point, it is necessary to briefly
review an analysis of rules.

Malott (1984) defines rules

as descriptions of behavioral contingencies, of which
there are two types.

First, there are rules that de

scribe direct acting behavioral contingencies, contingen
cies that directly affect a response class.

The second

type of rule are those that describe contingencies that
are not direct acting.

And these are contingencies that

seem to "involve outcomes that do not function as be
havioral consequences for the causal response (i.e., the
behavior of interest); instead the outcome affects the
response class through the action of a rule that de
scribes the contingency" (Malott, 1984, p. 4).

Examples

of rules that are not direct acting include "I had better
get out of bed now so I can start work on my paper early
in the morning";

"If we work hard now, we can have our

papers complete before spring break"; and "I need to
start that report now so I can have it ready for the
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company president by September."

Note that the rules

include no consequences that directly reinforce or punish
the behaviors of interest, but that the behaviors of
interest can be maintained by rules that describe contin
gency relations.
Some rules are hard to follow.

These rules involve

contingencies whose outcomes are either small and cumu
lative or improbable.
hard to follow.

Many of the rules stated above are

For example, stating

"If we work hard

now, we can have our papers complete before spring
break," is a rule that is difficult to follow because, at
any given moment, it makes little difference if one is or
is not studying, but cumulatively, this form of contin
gency can result in uncompleted tasks.
It may well have been that bad contingencies were
responsible for the failure to get consistent improve
ments in the performance of the contractors in Experi
ments 1 and 2.

Therefore, in Experiment 3, contractors

were told what they were to do. They were no longer
accountable for their students.

And the type of rules

that are difficult to follow were changed so that they
were easier to follow.

Namely, the rule given was of the

type "If you do not do one of these things on the list to
help at least one of your poorer-performing students by
the end of the week, you will definitely lose some
points."

Rules describing this sort of contingency may

I
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much more effectively control behavior, as they contain a
procrastination deterring deadline.

In other words, you

can put a deadline on when a student's performance has to
improve, but that does not put an effective deadline on
the specific acts that the contractor needs to do to
improve that performance.

Furthermore, there is some

probability that the student's performance will improve
without the intervention of the contractor; or the con
tractor may intervene and the performance of the student
will still not improve.

The point is that you may need

to change the rule to one that has a high probability
outcome; namely a rule that states "You will lose points
for not following the specified procedures" and one that
has a deadline.

And possibly the best way to do that is

to compensate contractors for following prescribed educa
tional practices, as opposed to compensating them for the
outcomes of their efforts.
For example, McCallum (1985) conducted a study to
determine the effects of process and outcome feedback on
the performance of student teachers.

It was hypothesized

that feedback would improve their performance and, conse
quently, the performance of the students they instructed.
The student teachers were undergraduate students enrolled
in a practicum course.

They were trained on the use of

DISTAR programs, and they used these programs to instruct
children enrolled in a private, non-profit preschool.
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McCallum collected process and outcome data on the
efforts of the student teachers.

The process measures

were pacing, percentage of correct responses students
made, and errors corrected.

The outcome measures were

the percentage of children in a group obtaining an 80%
score on the Continuous Progress Test (CPT), the number
of children requiring remediation, the percentage of
feedback cycles resulting in positive changes.
Student teachers were randomly assigned to one of
three different feedback conditions,
outcome,

(c) or both.

(a) process,

(b)

Baseline data were collected on

the groups each student teacher taught.

Each student

teacher's lowest performing group was targeted for inter
vention.

All other groups were used as control groups.

During baseline the lead teachers observed the
student teachers, but no formalized feedback mechanism
was used.

However, process and outcome measures were

collected at this time.
After baseline, each week the director would meet
with each lead teacher and give him or her performance
information on the targeted instructional groups.

The

lead teachers then met with each student teacher and
conducted feedback sessions using this information. The
lead teacher followed a specific script when meeting with
the student teachers.

Process, outcome, or process plus

outcome data provided by the Director were reviewed at
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this meeting.

The lead teachers provided social praise

for improvements in performance, and worked with student
teachers when problems arose.

CPTs were given following

each segment of the DISTAR program to determine if the
students had mastered the material.
McCallum's (1985) results support those of the
present experiment.

He comments that the results:

indicate that process feedback was more effec
tive in increasing human-performance than out
come feedback. Process feedback groups had the
largest number of children with increased CPT
accuracy.
Outcome feedback was effective in
increasing human-performance but to a lesser
extent than process feedback, outcome feedback
groups had the second largest number of child
ren with increased CPT accuracy. The combina
tion of process plus outcome feedback was the
least effective form of feedback in increasing
human-performance (p. 52).
McCallum, when attempting to account for why his
results differed from those obtained by Warren (1982),
notes "process feedback might be more effective while
learners are acquiring a new and complex repertoire
whereas outcome feedback might be more effective in
obtaining good performance involving previously acquired
skills" (McCallum, 1985, Abstract).
A serious problem with holding someone accountable
for the outcome of his or her performance (e.g., the
state of his or her teeth at the end of six months) is
that deadlines for specific acts are not specified.

Said

another way, people with or without the skills to perform
a job may have difficulty completing a task if there are
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no deadlines; therefore, having the skills is not the
critical issue.

People have the skills to stop putting

excessive amounts of salt on their food, but often they
continue to do so.

Therefore, an important issue seems

to be whether deadlines for specific acts have been
specified.

Said another way, the amount of reinforcement

for intervening on any given day must be sufficient in
order to maintain burdensome behavior over a long period
of time.
An investigator can specify a rule that describes a
contingency to be put on an outcome of a worker's imple
mentation.

And that may be effective if the intervention

is sufficiently simple, straightforward, and requires a
single expenditure of energy before evaluation.

For ex

ample, suppose that a foreman must turn in employee time
sheets early due to the disruption in schedule caused by
a holiday.

It may be that the foreman can give his crew

the rule "Turn in your time sheets by Thursday at 3:00
p.m. so you can receive your check on time," and this
rule may effectively control the worker's behavior.

In

this case, placing contingencies on outcome may work, but
it may work because it requires minimal effort and be
cause the instructions are unambiguous.

In essence, the

approach may be effective because it is almost equivalent
to a process orientation.
But the types of interventions called for in human-
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service interventions are typically more complex.

The

rules are not as clear cut, and reinforcement is not
forthcoming after each response.

Consequently, a more

effective method of generating improved performance may
be to place contingencies on process rather than outcome.
Using Gilbert's Terms
It has been argued that focusing on employee accom
plishments at the strategic and tactical levels is pro
bably the most efficient way to systematically and sub
stantially improve employee performance.

This is because

at these levels more effective deadlines can be estab
lished.

Furthermore, it has been argued that the problem

with making employees accountable for accomplishments at
the strategic and policy levels is that employee job
responsibilities are not specified; instead, the overall
mission of the organization and the strategies to ac
complish the mission are outlined at these levels.
Therefore, it seems that holding employees accountable
for higher-level accomplishments will work only (a) if
they are given a deadline in which to translate higherlevel objectives into specific job responsibilities, and
only (b) if effective behavioral consequences are del
ivered contingent upon their doing the jobs that they
themselves have outlined.
It should be emphasized that the move from an out
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come orientation to a process orientation does not neces
sarily suggest that issues related to the overall mission
of the Center were overlooked.

To emphasize this point,

Gilbert's (1978) ACORN test will be used to evaluate the
mission of the Center.
The ACORN Test
The purpose of the ACORN test is to evaluate the
Center's mission statement.

The ACORN test can help an

investigator determine whether the mission statement is
an accomplishment (i.e., behavior and its results that
may be seen as valuable), whether the Center has control
over the stated accomplishment, whether the stated objec
tives reconcile with one another, and whether or not the
accomplishment can be measured.
Mission Statement
As noted earlier, the Center is a program designed
to:

(a) help students on academic probation earn GPAs of

2.0 or above,

(b) help psychology students acquire effec

tive behavior management skills, and (c) provide psychol
ogy students with a research setting.
Is The Mission Statement an Accomplishment?

The

mission statement is an accomplishment in that each of
the of the three components of the Center's mission are
outcomes of value to relevant receiving systems. In
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addition, each of these components can be evaluated in
dependently, without references to the behavior of an
individual.

For examples,

student GPAs can be examined

by obtaining student grades following the end of the
semester.

The number of research assignments accepted by

the faculty committee members is also a means of access
ing the value of the Center's outputs.

Finally the

quality research generated by students can be demon
strated by examining the number of errors their papers
contain, the number of revisions suggested by committee
members, and by the number of papers published.

Do Staff Members Have Control Over the
Ac comp1ishments?

Whether the researcher and contractors have control
over the mission is a difficult question to answer.

It

would seem that they do have more control than is readily
apparent.

That is, procedures can be implemented that

would significantly increase,

for example,

students w ho earn a GPA of 2.0 or above.

the number of
But such proce

dures may require a great expenditure of time and energy.
The question does not seem to be whether researchers and
staff members have control over the missions, but rather
do they wish to invest the time and resources necessary
to affect the desired change.
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Is the Mission the Overriding Objective?

Gilbert (1978) suggests that systems analysts should
identify the one overriding objective of the system. This
suggestion might cause one to overlook important aspects
of the system;
looked.

in this case the contractors were o v e r 

For example,

assume that the Center's only

mission is to help probationary students earn a 2.0 or
above.

This perspective could cause one to spend a

significant amount of time identifying strategies to
accomplish this goal, while overlooking the contractors
who also want to gain something of value from their
experience in the Center.

In other words,

the contrac

tors may want to, for examples, acquire computer skills,
research skills,

systems analyst skills and so on, skills

that may not be directly relevant to their efforts to
help students get higher grades.

Therefore,

it would

seem necessary that systems analysts spend as m u c h time
developing a system that the contractors find valuable as
they spend developing strategies to help students on
academic probation earn higher GPAs.

Do the Components of the Center's Mission
Reconcile?

The Center has three components to its mission
statement:

(1) to help students on academic probation,

(2) to help contractors develop useful professional
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skills, and (3) to generate high quality research.
Several systems have been designed to accomplish these
goals.

There do seem to be times when these goals do not

reconcile with one another.

For example, a research

project may slow the implementation of procedures that
improve the performance of students. On the other hand,
it may hasten the elimination of procedures that do not
improve performance.
Can the Accomplishments be Numbered?
The success of our system can be evaluated by deter
mining how many students actually earned a 2.0 or above
in each of their other classes, and by how many research
papers are accepted by the faculty committee members.
That is, the mission has been defined so that we can
count the number of accomplishments participants produce.
Conclusion
In summary, issues related to the overall mission of
the Center were addressed, and the strategies used to
accomplish the mission were outlined.

It can be argued,

however, that the most appropriate strategies to achieve
the mission were not used.

For example, it can be argued

that in order to improve student academic performance,
one should focus on the students' intellectual abilities.
But issues of this kind are empirical, and further re
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search should identify the most appropriate combination
of contingencies that will improve the academic perfor
mance of high-risk students.
Other Issues
Reversal Phase
A reversal phase following the implementation of the
incentive condition would have made the argument more
convincing that the accountability procedure was respon
sible for the contractors' improved performance.

The

number of weeks in the semester prohibited the experi
menter from implementing such a procedure.

When the

experimenter discovered that contractors were helping
those students with percentages higher than 80%, it was
deemed more appropriate to demonstrate that an incentive
condition would cause contractors to help students with
lower percentages.

It could be argued that requiring the

students to implement special procedures only with those
students who earned below 80% in the course constituted a
changing criterion design.

However, it is more accurate

to say that the contingencies stated at the outset of the
experiment were enforced.
It should be emphasized that none of the contractors
were implementing any of the special procedures with
either the high or the low performing students prior to
the introduction of the incentive program.

This indi-
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cates that such an incentive program was effective, and
that it is unlikely that an external influence simul
taneously increased and maintained the performance of
three of the four contractors.
Homework
Most of the academic-performance contractors elected
to help students in classes other than the self-manage
ment course (mean = 92%).

This was an interesting find

ing because one might assume that the contractors would
elect to implement easier procedures.

For example, the

contractors might have elected to send the students to
other campus programs or that they might have elected to
meet with the program director to discuss the performance
of a particular student (both of these procedures would
have counted as appropriate activities).

Instead the

contractors implemented procedures that may have taken
more effort on their part, procedures that might more
directly affect the student's performances in their other
classes.
The contractors may have helped students with their
homework because the students requested this help.

That

is, when the contractors informed students that they were
implementing procedures to help them "do better" the stu
dents themselves could have requested help in their other
courses, as opposed to seeking help to improve their

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54
grades in the self-management course.

The students

probably opted to have the contractors help them in their
other courses because they were already performing well
in the Center.

But this analysis does not account for

the fact that when the instructions were clarified, the
performance contractors still helped the students who
were falling below criterion with their homework.
That the contractors helped students with their
homework instead of helping them improve their grades in
the Center is also interesting because this means extra
work for the contractor.

If their students are all above

the minimal criterion, then they do not have to implement
any special procedures for that week.

Therefore, it

would seem that the contractors would have done things to
improve the students' grades in the Center.

And in fact

if that were what the experimenter were primarily con
cerned with, the options provided to the contractor
should have been limited to those that would have im
proved the students' Center grades.
But in any event, the contractors may not have
understood the following rule:

"When the students' per

formance falls below 80%, if you manage to do any one of
the following things and those things increase the per
formance of the students, then those students might be
above 80% and then you would not have to do this extra
work in the future."

But if they were able to state such
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a rule, this rule did not effectively control their
behavior.

Instead, the contractors implemented pro

cedures that were not designed to take students off of
the high-risk role and not designed to benefit the con
tractors themselves, in terms of lightening their supplemental-support load.
However, one should not necessarily view as a pro
blem that the academic-performance contractors helped
students with the material in their other courses.

The

contractors may have stated a rule as "If I help the
students with their homework, they will be more fun to
work with and I'll eventually get social recognition to
go with the satisfaction I feel."

In other words, the

contractors could have been more sensitive to the overall
mission of helping students improve their grades than
they were to following the prescribed procedures.

How

ever, Experiments 1 and 2 make this less than a satisfac
tory explanation.

But if the contractors are going to

tutor their students, then they may need some special
instruction in academic skills techniques.
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CHAPTER XIII

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Two issues related to all three of the experiments
are discussed below.

Helping the Better Prepared Student

This study was designed primarily to help those stu
dents w h o wer e performing at or b elow the "C" level.
However, the academic-performance contractors tended to
implement special procedures to help those students with
the highest grades in the Center.

And it is interesting

that it was difficult to get contractors to help the
lower-achieving students.

For example,

in Experiment 3

the contractors were instructed to keep a graph of all of
their students'

grades.

They were told that this graph

was to be use d to identify which of their students needed
special assistance.

All of the contractors brought these

graphs to the staff meeting on w e e k 8.
From w e e k 7 to 9 week the experimenter only m o n i 
tored whether or not the contractors had implemented
special procedures.

Unfortunately, the experimenter did

not also monitor the grades of the students who were
receiving special assistance.

(He assumed that the con-

56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
tractors were helping those students whose grades were
80% or below.)

During the ninth week, however, the

experimenter recorded the grades of the students the
contractors were helping, and discovered that they were
not helping those students who were in most need of help.
At this point, the experimenter required the aca
demic-performance contractors to record the students'
weekly percentage on the general-log; and they were again
informed that they would only earn the 25 points for
helping those students who had earned 80% or below.

It

was not until contractors could earn points only for
helping students whose self-management course grade was
80% or below that they did so.
Improving Student Grades in Content
Courses: The Ultimate Objective
The procedures implemented in this study were de
signed to directly affect the performance of the contrac
tors.

It was hoped that contractor productivity would

result in an improvement in student performance, espe
cially with respect to their performance in the Center.
The failure of the contractors to improve the students'
performance is not a failure of this particular study.
Experiment 3 demonstrated control over the contractors'
behavior, which was the goal of the study.

But the fact

that control was obtained in the third experiment is
57
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hardly surprising because it has been demonstrated timeand-time again that if you present points contingent on
performance you will get performance.
However, because contractor performance can be im
proved with incentives and instructions, the next reason
able step seems to be that of improving the skills of the
academic-performance contractors, so that they will be in
a better position to improve the performance of the
students they supervise.
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CHAPTER XIV
CONCLUSION
Is accountability possible?

The answer to this

question may be that the accountability contingency may
either be insufficient or of little supplemental value.
This is because the general nature of accountability for
human service accomplishments is such that each instance
of helping a student in need may have only a small and
cumulative effect.

And the probability that each action

will pay off or that a failure to act will cause a real
problem makes following certain types of rules difficult.
Such rules are difficult to follow because they do not
have deadlines, and the lack of deadlines may be an
inherent flaw in the concept of accountability that can
make its implementation a bad idea.

One may impose an

accountability procedure on people, but this may or may
not be of any value, especially if people are required to
follow rules that are difficult to follow.

Therefore, a

more effective strategy to achieve performance improve
ments may be to make the presentation of rewards con
tingent on following rules that are easier to follow,
i.e., rules stating frequent deadlines.
The problem of procrastination due to the lack of
59
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deadlines is also a problem in business and industry.
Kleiner and Yada (1986) note
For managers, [procrastination] can pose a
great problem since procrastination stops the
full use of an employee's potential.
This, in
turn, can cost an organization valuable time,
energy, and money. Procrastination can result
in unattainable deadlines, decreased produc
tivity, and personnel problems.
(p. 11)
Sales people particularly have a problem with pro
crastination.

Mirman (1982) commented that:

Many sales managers would like to believe that their
sales people, particularly those operating under
commission or incentive contingencies, use all their
skills appropriately on every opportunity. Although
this perception is tantamount to a belief in Easter
bunnies and tooth fairies, it is easy to understand
how managers can develop this delusion.
(p. 434)
However, incentives contingent on both process and
outcome have been shown to improve the performance of
sales persons.

For examples, Brown, Malott, Dillon, and

Keeps (1980) showed that feedback given to employees on
(a) approaching customers,

(b) greeting customers,

(c)

courtesy, and (d) closing the sale could be improved with
feedback.

But in addition, Brown et al. showed that the

performance of sales persons could be improved and main
tained when told that they would be evaluated by cus
tomers .
Warren (1978) obtained data on the amount of the
average sale for a department store.
$19.

This amount was

He required sales people to circle any sale above

$19 and told them the store was attempting to increase

»
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the dollar value of its average sale t o $23. Graphic
feedback on average dollars was posted for each employee.
The average amount of each sale reached this n ew goal
within five weeks and stabilized throughout the duration
of the study.

Although it is not clear whether the

employee's circling each sale or the graphic feedback was
responsible for the improved performance,

these data

suggest that, at least in some circumstances,

perfor

mance can be improved when feedback is contingent on both
process and outcome.
Kleiner and Yada

(1986) provide recommendations on

how managers c an overcome procrastination.

They recom

mend that managers set clear limits, deadlines,
consequences.

and

More specifically, the authors recommend

that managers state "specifically what needs to be done,
when it should be done by, and the outcome if it is not
done"

(p. 11).

Next, Kleiner and Yada state that mana

gers should set small,
tinator.

interim goals w i t h the procras

They contend that this approach helps the

procrastinator set realistic goals.

T he third step

involves manager's delivering behavioral consequences
more frequently than would normally be the cause for the
procrastinator's progress.

The fourth step is to let the

procrastinator know directly of any angry feelings; but
the manager should avoid being judgmental and excessively
negative.

Finally, the manager should let the employee
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know his worth.

The manager should let the employees

know that they are competent individuals and let them
know that they are aware of their other personal commit
ments .
Other Issues
It has often been argued that the talents and skills
of employees are overlooked, and that more responsibility
should be turned over to them because they have many good
ideas that can help revolutionize the functioning of an
organization.

It is true that the first-line personnel

may in some instances have a better idea of what to do
than top management.

However, the problem is that know

ing what to do, and knowing what rule to follow and
actually doing it are two different things.

So, people

who advocate light-management are turning over accoun
tability to the first-line employees who will not be
likely to follow hard-to- follow rules.

This is a prob

lem because rules that are hard to follow are often
involved in implementing the good ideas that these em
ployees in fact have.

Therefore, you do need management

control over the performance of the employees, even if it
is no more control than to ensure that the employees act
upon the good ideas that they themselves have generated.
A similar analysis might be made for the college
professor who attempts to develop strategies to improve
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the performance of under-prepared students.
to be two problems:

There seem

(1) whether the college professor

knows what to do, and (2) whether the proper contingen
cies are in effect.
Developing and implementing strategies to help the
under-prepared student is a difficult undertaking, and,
at least in some cases, a skill not within the realm of
expertise of the typical college professor.

Therefore,

researchers who are competent in this area may need to
devise a set of educational strategies that are at once
effective and palatable to professors.
However, the managing faction of an organization may
need to provide additional incentives to insure that this
technology is implemented, as in all cases where the
development of a new technology requires special-addi
tional effort.

Therefore, it may be up to university

administrators to ensure that faculty members use this
technology to help the under-prepared student succeed at
the university.
The point has been made that the problem with out
come feedback (pay learning) is timing and specificity.
Compensating faculty for the performance of their stu
dents is a contingency that is often too delayed to
effectively improve the performance of faculty.

However,

from an administrator's perspective, accountability for
grades is an issue that he or she must confront routinely
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(e.g., grades may lead to loss of students and loss of
revenue).

As a practical suggestion, higher level ad

ministrators can hold deans or department chairs account
able for grades (outcome) and hope that they, in turn,
would hold instructors accountable for specific be
haviors.

However, more research is needed to test the

merits of this approach.
This study was conducted on the assumption that
there will be an increasing need for universities to
devise procedures to help under-prepared student, given
that a substantial number of them will be entering uni
versities in the next two decades.

The procedures men

tioned in this experiment provide one alternative to help
under-prepared

students achieve greater success.
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Behavioral Contracting syllabus, Psychology 397
MEETING DAYS:
Monday 5:00 to 6:00 p.m., and as
schedule with contracting supervisor and students.
302 Wood Hall
COURSE INSTRUCTOR:
OFFICE HOURS:

Room

XXXX

By Appointment
Room 305 Wood Hall
Office Phone: 383-1525
Home Phone: 388-5095 (Do not call
after 10:00 p.m.)

COURSE OBJECTIVES
This course is a practicum in applied behavior analysis. In
this course, you will be confronted with the types of per
sonnel management problems that you will routinely encoun
ter as a professional.
Consequently, you will be expected
to use what you know about behavioral psychology to improve
the performance of the students you supervise. The selfmanagement center is designed to give you experience in
managing human performance.
In the "real world" you will
encounter performance problems similar to those you will
experience as a staff member for the Center: employees will
not show up for work; the quality of their work is poor,
and so on. At some point in your career, it will be your
responsibility to improve such performance problems.
It
will not be adequate to blame the poor-performer for their
poor-performance.
It is all too easy to state that "if
they don't care, there is noting I can do for them." It is
the purpose of this course to give you experience at de
signing interventions that effect beneficial behavioral
changes in the students that you supervise without "blaming
the victim."
COURSE FORMAT
Study Center Monitor
As study center monitor, you will be expected to record
student attendance, to minimize student disruptive beha
vior, and to evaluate student products. You will earn
points toward your grade to the extent that these respon
sibilities are met. You will be assigned to specific days
and times depending on your own academic and personal
schedule.
Planned Absence. You will be expected to attend your
regularly scheduled study center hours. If for any reason
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you are unable to monitor the study center, you should
contact the program director or the contracting supervisor
24 hours in advance of the absence so that adequate staff
ing can be obtained. One absence from study center monitor
ing will not result in a reduction in your grade. However,
each absence following the first will result in a reduction
in your semester grade by one half of a letter grade. That
is, if you were to earn an "A" in the self-management
center, your grade would be lowered to a "B/A" as a result
of the additional absence.
Illness and Other Unexpected Emergencies. One unex
cused absence from the study center will not result in any
reduction in your course grade. That is, if you become ill
in the morning and are not able to attend the study center,
merely call the program director or contracting supervisor
at least one hour before you were scheduled to monitor the
study center. In addition to the one unexcused absence, you
will be allowed two excused absences. Excused absences
require that you submit verification from the Health Center
of your illness to the program director or contracting
supervisor.
Other unexpected emergencies will be handled in the same
manner; that is, the first unexcused absence will not
result in any reduction in your course grade. Subsequent
absences require verification.
Incidentally, the cate
gories illnesses and other unexpected emergencies are not
mutually exclusive.
That is, you are allowed a total of
three absences (one unexcused and two excused) from study
center monitoring, regardless of whether the absence was
due to illness or some other unexpected emergency. After
the third absence, your semester grade will be lowered by
one letter grade.
Contracting
As contractor, you will be assigned approximately five
students. You will be responsible for assisting in the
completion of their academic work. It will be your
responsibility (as well as the student's) to meet with each
of your students weekly, to complete a contract, and to
ensure that your students are performing adequately in the
self-management course.
Failure to Attend a Meeting With a Student
The possible grade that you can earn in the self-management
center will be lowered by one letter grade the second time
you miss a meeting with any of your students. In other
words, you can miss one meeting with a student and there
will be no consequences. However, the next time you miss a
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meeting with a student, the grade you would have earned in
self-management center will be lowered by one letter grade;
and each additional missed meeting will result in the
lowering of your possible grade by one letter.
So if you
would have earned a B in the self management center, your
final grade would be a C.
This is not to say, however, that the possible grade you
can earn in the self-management course will be lowered if a
meeting is not held between yourself a student because the
student may have been responsible for the missed meeting.
But if you elected to miss a meeting(s) with a student,
your grade will be lowered by one letter grade each time
you miss a meeting.
Double Contracts
There will be no double contracting this semester.
Submitting Contracts Late
Contracts must be turned in every Friday by 3:00 p.m.
If a
student is responsible for a missed meeting, he or she has
lost the opportunity to earn points for the missed meeting
unless the meeting is held before Friday at 3:00 p.m.
If the contractor is responsible for the missed meeting,
the student will submit a form in which their grade will
not be based on the contracting points for that week.
Phone Logs
You will be required to record all phone calls that you
make to your assigned students. The students must verify
that these phone calls were made by initialing your phone
log.
General-loqs
The general observation log is a form that you will use to
record those special activities you engaged in to help your
student.
Items listed on this form should not include
routine contracting tasks. Again, you need to have the
respective student(s) sign for each special activity you
indicate.
Request for the Removal of Student from Caseload
It is important that you keep thorough and accurate records
of your efforts to help your students perform well. This is
because, occasionally, your efforts will not improve a
student's performance. After the end of the sixth week, a
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meeting will be held between yourself, the program direc
tor, and the faculty advisor.
You must present to the
faculty advisor documentation (i.e. phone logs, generallogs, graphs) of your efforts to help a particular stu
dent (s) . If the faculty advisor agrees that all has been
done that c an be done to help a particular student but yet
his or her self-management course grade has not improved,
then this student will no longer be included in your case
load (i.e. your grade will not be based on this student's
grade).
Staff Me e t i n g
Staff meetings will be held every Monday from 5:30 to 6:30
p.m. A t these meetings, we will review problems encountered
during the past week and announce new procedures. You will
be responsible for all new procedures announced at these
meetings. In addition, you must notify the program director
if y ou are too ill to attend the staff meetings.
Meeting w i t h Contracting Supervisor
You will be required to hold a weekly meeting with the
contracting supervisor. At these meetings, you will have
the opportunity to discuss any problems you are facing with
particular students and report your progress and accomp
lishments.
Jobs
The program director does not assume the responsibility to
make any undue scheduling changes if jobs interfere with
your responsibility as a staff member.
You will be ex
pected to attend all staff meetings, maintain your office
hours, and m e e t with your students at the designated time.
It would greatly improve the functioning of the center if
you structure your work schedule so that it does not inter
fere with your responsibilities as a contractor.
How Your Grade is Computed
Your grade is based on the extent to which you meet the
required responsibilities as contractor and to the extent
to whi c h y o u are able improve the performance of the stu
dents you supervise. The point distributions for your grade
are listed below:
Responsibility

Weekly Points

Contracting

60

Study Center

20
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15

Staff Meeting

5

Meeting With Supervisor
Total

100

Special Procedure Requirement
In addition to the above, you can earn an additional 25
points for implementing procedures to help improve the
grades of the poorer-performing students.
So, you will be
required to earn 125 each week. More on this procedure will
be provided in a supplement at the second staff meeting.
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CENTER FOR THE SELF-MANAGEMENT OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Psychology 397, Student Syllabus
COURSE INSTRUCTOR:
OFFICE HOURS:

XXXX

By Appointment
Room 305 Wood Hall
Office Phone: 383-1525
Home Phone: 388-5095 (Do not call after
10:00 p.m.)

Welcome to the Center for the Self-Management of Academic
Performance. This course focuses on study behavior, self
management, and study skills. The format of the course will
be somewhat different from the other courses in which you
are enrolled. We hope you will find your experiences with
us enjoyable and valuable.
There are several systems that operate within the Center
They include (a) the study center, (b) the contracting, and
(c) the study skills program. A description of each system
follows.
STUDY CENTER ATTENDANCE
You will be required to earn 100 points a week in the study
center. To earn these 100 points, it is required that you
study at least two hours a day (eight-hours a week) in the
study center. The center will be open from 3:00 p.m. to
5:00 p.m. and from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. Monday through Thurs
day. You should select the time(s) you find most convenient
for studying, but the time blocks you select MUST fall
between the hours given above.
Study Center Proof of Accomplishment
You will be required to produce accomplishments while in
the study center. These accomplishments include flash
cards, workbook assignments, math problems, and notes for a
paper. A staff person will check your accomplishments and
award you points when you complete your study session.
Mandatory Flash Card Mastery. You are required to
master a minimum of 6 flash cards for every hour you
at+end the study center. So if you are in the study center
for two hours, you are required to master 12 flash cards.
Each flash card that you master in addition to the 6 or 12
will count as two bonus-points.
Bonus-Points. You can earn bonus points for having
made additional cards while at the study center. However,
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you are required to master flash cards before you can earn
bonus points.
That is, if you attend t h e study center for
two hours, y ou must master 12 flash cards.
You can earn
one bonus point for every card y o u have made in addition to
the 12 (or two bonus-points for every additional card you
m a s t e r ) . However, you can only earn an additional 20 points
for flash cards that are not mastered. There is not a limit
on the number of bonus-points you can earn for cards that
are mastered.
Math Problems
Mi n i m u m Requirements and B o n u s - P o i n t s . You are re
quired to complete a minimum of three pages of math p ro
blems in t wo hours to earn full credit for attending the
study center.
You can an earn three extra bonus-points for
each additional page of math problems y o u complete.
Assignments in Workbooks
M i n i m u m Requirements and B o n u s - P o i n t s . You are r e 
quired to complete ten pages of workbook exercises in two
hours to earn full credit for attending the study center.
You can e a r n an additional two points for every page you
have completed in additional to the ten.
Written Material
M i n i m u m Requirements and B o n u s - P o i n t s . You are r e 
quired to complete 3 pages (7 pages of notes) of writing to
earn full credit for attending the study center. You can
earn an additional three bonus-points for each page in
addition to these three.
Other Policies and Procedures
Attending the Study Center Early
It is inconvenient for people (who are often not staff
members) t o sign out students if students attend the study
center at times other than from 3:00-5:00 or from
7:00-9:00.
This is because these students may be studying
for exams or engaged in other activities.
You may use the
study center from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. However, this does
not count toward your 8 required hours.
Excessive Talking.

Sleeping, and Off Task Behavior

The study center needs to be quiet if an environment
suitable for studying is to be maintained.
Therefore,
procedures to limit excessive noise and distractions must
be imposed.
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Excessive Talking. If the study center becomes too
noisy, the staff person on duty will prompt those in the
room that the noise level has become excessive.
If talking
does not decrease, then the people responsible for the
noise will be signed out of study center by the staff
person and have lost the opportunity to earn any points for
that day.
Sleeping. Similarly, if a person is sleeping in the
study center, they will be requested to resume work on his
or her assignments.
If this person does not do so they
will be signed out of study center and has lost the oppor
tunity to earn points for that day.
Off Task Behavior. Off task behavior includes (but is
not limited to) reading the newspaper, magazines, and other
reading materials not related to an academic course.
The
same procedures with respect to excessive noise and sleep
ing will be imposed under these conditions.
CONTRACTING SYSTEM
You will be required to meet weekly with a contractor at
the study center. The initial contracting session will last
about one hour. Subsequent sessions should last anywhere
from 45 minutes to an hour. It is important that you meet
with your contractor as soon as possible and as regularly
as possible because contracting points comprise half of
your grade. Note that if a contractor fails to attend a
meeting, contact either the program director or the con
tracting supervisor, and another contractor will be as
signed to you for the week of the missed meeting.
Study Skills Workshops. During the first-week of the
semester you will not be required to produce accomplish
ments in the study center in order to earn your points.
You will, however, be required to attend workshops offered
by Intellectual Skills department. These workshops are
important because what you will learn in them will be used
throughout the semester during your meetings with your
contractor. These workshops will be held on January 7th and
8th from 3:00 to 5:00 and from 7:00 to 9:00. Different
topics will be covered on each day, so make sure that you
attend at least one of the sessions on each day.
PROFESSOR INVOLVEMENT
Occasionally, your contractor will call your professor when
you are not able to show verification of a course grade.
This procedure will help to insure that we are able to
implement procedures to help you maintain good performance.
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HOW YOUR GRADE IS COMPUTED
Your points in this course come from a variety of sources.
The various categories listed below will be explained in
detail in class. But NOTE THE IMPORTANCE OF ATTENDING THE
STUDY CENTER, meeting with your contractor and meeting
other course requirements.
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Task category
Mon
study Center

Tues

Wed

Thurs

Wkly Total

25

25

25

100

25

Attendance

20

20

Contract

40

40

Study Skills

40

40
Weekly Total

200

(The Contracting session equals 100 points. It is composed
of attendance to the contracting session, the contracting
tasks and the study skills requirements)
Other Course Requirements:
Progress Reports

100

Feedback Sessions

25

100
X 4

100

You will receive a grade for the study center each week.
How the grade is computed is presented below.
End of the Semester Grading Scale
Weekly Percent of
Points Earned
92-100
88-92
83-87
78-82
73-77
66-72
63-67

Weekly Grade
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0

Letter Grc
A
B/A
B
C/B
C
D/C
D

Note that you should attempt to earn all of your points
every week because attempting to regain points in latter
weeks will only improve your grade very slightly.
Incentive Program
For those students who earn 125 percent or more of the
points possible for 5 weeks in a row, can earn a record
album or a cassette tape of their choice (Only 15 albums
can be awarded).
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Materials
Long Term Planning Sheet.

The contractors were re

quired to report dates of mid terms, finals and any pro
jects due during the semester for each of their students.
This enabled the contractors to contract regularly for
components of these assignments.
Sign In Sheets.

The sign in sheet was a form contrac

tors completed each time they monitored the study center.
The form helped to insure that contractors were available
to answer all student questions and monitor student perfor
mance .
Phone Logs.

Contractors were required to call stu

dents and complete the phone log each time

a student

missed either a contracting session or did not regularly
attend the study center.

In addition, contractors were

required to record the phone calls they made to professors.

Monitor Forms.

The monitor form listed each of the

tasks contractors were required to complete.

The experi

menter awarded contractors points that counted toward their
course grade for completing these tasks.

The experimenter

also used this form to inform the contractors of their
weekly and cumulative point totals.
Contracting Checklists.

The contracting checklist
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contained those activities contractors were required to
engage in during contracting sessions.
General Observation Log.

Contractors were required to

use the general observation log to record noteworthy obser
vations and interventions.

This log was reviewed by the

experimenter weekly.
The same materials used in experiment 1 were used in
experiments 1 and 2, except where indicated.
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Center for the Self-Management of Academic Performance
Long Term Planning Sheet
Student Name ______________
Course

Contractor's Name___________

Test/Quiz/Project

Due Date

Grade
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CENTER FOR THE Self-Management OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
SIGN IN/STUDY CENTER MONITOR FORM
Contractor's Name ______________________
Week Number
Date and Day
On
Time
2

Points
Awarded
2

Noise
Low

No
Sleeping

No
Off Task

2

2

2

Points Earned and
Supervisor Initials Below

Date and Day
On
Time
2

Points
Awarded
2

Noise
Low

No
Sleeping

No
Off Task

2

2

2

Points Earned and
Supervisor Initials Below

Date and Day
On
Time
2

Points
Awarded
2

Noise
Low
2

No
Sleeping

No
Off Task

2

2

Points Earned and
Supervisor Initials Below
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Center for the Self-Management of Academic Performance
Phone Logs
Your Name --------------------- ------- ----Week Number --------Student
Name

Date

Student's
RATIONALE
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CENTER FOR THE Self-Management OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Monitor Form
TASKS
0 = not done
1 = done
v = void

WEEK

W%

C%

1
2

3
4
5
6

7
9
10
11

12
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Center for the Self-Management of Academic Performance
General Observation and Communication Log

Date
Regard
ing
From
Date
Regard
ing
From

Date
Regard
ing
From

Date
Regard
ing
From
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Table 1
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of The Semester
(All Students)

Experiment 1

Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Student
Special
Meetings Bonus
Points
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 1
0.383
Accountability

0.194

70.297

6.777

2.580

87.13

Group 2
0.689
0.048
No-accountability

58.332

2.895

1.890

72.63

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor

Table 2
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of The Semester
(Student Percentages Below 72%)

Experiment 1

Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus
Student
Points
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 1
0.357
Accountability

0.103

26.383

3.75

3.250

48.25

Group 2
0.568
0.044
No-accountability

26.664

2.222

1.667

35.89

N o t e ; The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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Table 3
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of The Semester
(Student Percentages Between 72% and 89.9%)
Experiment 1
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Mean
Percent Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 1
0.429
Accountability

0.357

78.571

4.57

9.08

78.26

Group 2
0.708 0.080
No-accountability

67.875

2.20

3.00

79.44

Note: The data reoresent weeklv averacres per contractor

Table 4
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Above 90%)
Experiment 1
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 1 0.385
Accountability

0.200

93.750

7.418

0.386

109.89

Group 2 0.829
0.029
No-accountabi1ity

86.957

3.583

1.477

111.16

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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Table 5
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(All Students)
Experiment 1
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Mean
Percent Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Points Removed Pet.
Procedures Held

Group 2
0.167
Accountability

0.033

58.332

3.763

0.500

58.08

Group 1
0.143
No-accountability

0.036

81.607

6.000

1.071

83.57

Note: The data represent weekly averaaes per contractor

Table 6
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Below 72%)
Experiment 1
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls
Group 2
0.265
Accountability

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Special
Points Removed Pet.
Procedures Held
0.000

28.330

0.384

0.92

25.85

Group 1
0.263
0.053
No-accountability

56.660

3.888

6.25

46.82

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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Table 7
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(Student Percentages Between 72% and 90%)
Experiment 1
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 2
0.000
Accountability

0.167

74.2

3.33

0.000

81.42

Group 1
0.111
No-accountability

0.000

76.9

7.62

1.250

81.78

Note; The data represent weekly averages per contractor
Table 8
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(Student Percentages Above 90%)
Experiment 1
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 2
0.050
Accountab i1ity

0.050

87.500

6.210

1.222

105.87

Group 1
0.071
No-accountabi1ity

0.036

90.909

6.222

0.500

109.08

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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Quality Control Supervisor
Data Collection Form: Contracting Session
Week Number _______

Date_________

Contractor _ _ _ ____________________________________
Student's Name

_________________________

Required Materials
Points
Possible
Syllabus for of the student's classes

4

Comprehensive Reading Forms

2

Lecture Note Taking Forms

2

Week at a Glance

2

Points
Earned

Total Points Earned .................
Evaluation
1 . On Time and Prepared
For Meeting
More than
five minutes
late for

Early for
meeting and
all re

meeting and
unorganized

materials
present

quired

Maintains Good
Interpersonal and
Professional
Relationships

Contractor
begins
session with
"small talk"
and the
student
seems
relaxed

Contracting
session seems
hurried and
student remains
standing

8

3. Contract is Specific
Contractors are
not detailed and
the same task
is required of

10

Contract is
specific to
every course
and creative
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every course
("show work")

use is made
of intel
lectual
skills
material

4. Effort required
Contract can be
completed in
twenty minutes
5. Submitted tasks
checked thoroughly
for accuracy and
completeness

Students
need two hours a
day to complete
contract

Points are
awarded without
proof of
accomplishment

6. Points, current
date,and due date are
recorded correctly Points are not
totaled at top
of contract and
some items on
contract do not
have points

Completed
work matches
items
specified on
contract

All of
contract
completed

7. Contract Filed
Contracting folder
left on desk or
misfiled

All forms
filed
correctly
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Table 1
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of Semester
(All Students)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 1
0.457
Accountability

0.101

56.52

2.500

4.769 82.92

Group 2
0.438
No-accountability

0.118

59.03

3.764

2.470

82.43

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor
Table 2
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Below 72%)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 1
0.521
Accountability

0.083

33.33

1.562

5.625

44.77

Group 2
0.483
0.150
No-accountabi1ity

31.67

2.631

3.684

43.65

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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Table 3
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Above 72%)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Mean
Percent Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.
0.111

70.00

0.698

4.000

Group 2
0.405
0.095
No-accountability

77.38

0.153

2.000 110.13

Group 1
0.422
Accountabi1ity

103.27

Note: The data represent weekly averaaes oer contractor
Table 4
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of Semester
(All Students)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Mean
Percent Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.
0.101

56.52

2.500

4.769

82.92

Student
0.463 0.148
Group 3
No-accountabi1ity

66.67

1.805

4.166

87.41

Group 1
0.457
Account ab i1 ity

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
Table 5
Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of Semester
(Student Percentages Below 72%)

Experiment 2

Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Student
Special
Meetings Bonus
Points
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

0.083

33.33

0.562

5.625

44.77

Student
0.250
0.250
Group 3
No-accountability

37.50

3.333

1.666

42.43

Group 1
0.521
Accountabi1ity

Note: The data represent weeklv averages per contractor

Table 6

Contractor and Student Performance for the
First-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Above 72%)

Experiment 2

Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Percent Mean
Mean
Mean
Meetings Bonus
Points
Student
Special
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

0.111

70.00

2.698

4.000

103.27

Student
0.533
0.105
Group 3
No-accountabi1 ity

73,68

1.607

4.285

106.36

Group 1
0.422
Accountabi1ity

N o t e : The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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Table 7
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(All Students)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Mean
Percent Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.
0.107

60.71

4.116

3.088

82.77

Group 1
0.155
0.124
No-accountabi1ity

60.87

5.346

6.020

83.94

Group 2
0.161
Accountability

Note: The data represent weekly averaaes per contractor
Table 8
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Below 72%)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Mean
Percent Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.

Group 2
0.174
Accountab i1ity

0.09

29.29

1.400

0.800

29.29

Group 1
0.125
No-accountability

0.04

25.00

2.450

5.625

31.24

Note; The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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Table 9
Contractor and Student Performance For the
Second-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Above 72%)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.
0.120

84.78

5.00

5.000

126.96

Group 1
0.175 0.175
No-accountabi1ity

84.54

6.207

6.341

118.72

Group 2
0.151
Accountability

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor
Table 10
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(All Students)
Experiment 2

Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.
0.107

60.71

4.116

3.088

82.77

Student
0.175
0.048
Group 3
No-accountability

58.73

4.864

2.162

68.73

Group 2
0.161
Accountabi1ity

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor
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Table 11
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Below 72%)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls
Group 2
0.125
Accountability

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.
0.092

29.29

1.400

student
0.189
0.054
Group 3
No-accountability

35.14

2.307

0.800
0.769

29.29
40.88

Note: The data represent weeklv averaaes per contractor
Table 12
Contractor and Student Performance for the
Second-Half of Semester
(Students Percentages Above 72%)
Experiment 2
Mean
GROUP/
Phone
CONDITION Calls
Student
0.151
Group 2
Accountabi1ity

Mean
Percent Mean
Mean
Special
Meetings Bonus Points Student
Procedures Held
Points Removed Pet.
0.120

84.78

5.000

5.000

126.96

Student
0.154
0.038
Group 3
No-accountability

92.31

6.250

3.750

108.37

Note: The data represent weekly averages per contractor

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX G
Summary Data for Each Contractor in Experiment 2

101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102
Table 1
Student Impact on Contractor l's Grade

Contractor 1

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

67.2

1

60.2

3

95.7

1

88.7

4

79.8

1

72.8

5

97.2

1

90.2

6

100.0

0

100.0

7

100.0

0

100.0

8*

69.0

1

62.0

9*

91.0

1

84.0

10*

100.0

1

93.0

11*

100.0

1

93.0

12*

100.0

3

79.0

13*

100.0

1

93.0

14*

100.0

0

100.0

* = Reversal
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Table 2
Student Impact on Contractor 2' s Grade

contractor 2

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

100.0

1

93.0

3

100.0

3

79.0

4

100.0

3

79.0

5

100.0

2

86.0

6

100.0

0

100.0

7

100.0

1

93.0

8*

100.0

1

93.0

9*

100.0

1

93.0

10*

100.0

0

100.0

11*

100.0

1

93.0

12*

100.0

3

79.0

13*

100.0

0

100.0

14*

100.0

2

86.0

* = Reversal
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Table 3
Student Impact on Contractor 3's Grade

Contractor 3

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

100.0

0

100.0

3

67.5

1

60.5

4

87.5

1

80.5

5

79.1

0

79.1

6

100.0

1

93.0

7

100.0

2

86.0

8*

97.0

1

90.0

9*

97.0

1

90.0

10*

100.0

1

93.0

11*

100.0

1

93.0

12*

100.0

3

79.0

13*

90.7

1

83 .7

14*

100.0

1

93.0

* = Reversal
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Table 4
Student Impact on Contractor 4 1s Grade

Contractor 4

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

97.2

1

90.2

3

100.0

2

86.0

4

100.0

2

86.0

5

100.0

1

93.0

6

100.0

1

93.0

7

100.0

2

86.0

8*

100.0

1

93.0

9*

91.9

1

84.9

10*

100.0

1

93.0

11*

97.3

1

90.3

12*

100.0

2

86.0

13*

100.0

1

93.0

14*

100.0

1

93.0

* = Reversal
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Table 5
Student Impact on Contractor 5's Grade

Contractor 5

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

94.0

0

94.0

3

100.0

1

93.0

4

100.0

1

93.0

5

100.0

0

100.0

6

100.0

0

100.0

7

100.0

0

100.0

8*

100.0

1

93.0

9*

87.5

0

87.5

10*

100.0

1

93.0

11*

100.0

0

100.0

12*

100.0

2

86.0

13*

100.0

0

100.0

14*

100.0

0

100.0

* = Reversal
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Table 6
Student Impact on Contractor 6's Grade

Contractor 6

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

100.0

1

93.0

3

87.6

2

73.6

4

100.0

1

93.0

5

100.0

3

79.0

6

79.1

2

65.1

7

100.0

1

93.0

8*

100.0

2

86.0

g*

100.0

1

93.0

10*

100.0

2

86.0

11*

100.0

2

86.0

12*

92.7

1

85.7

13*

100.0

2

86.0

14*

100.0

2

86.0

* = Reversal
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Table 7
Student Impact on Contractor 7's Grade

Contractor 7

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

100.0

0

100.0

3

100.0

0

100.0

4

100.0

1

93.0

5

100.0

1

93.0

6

100.0

0

100.0

7

100. 0

1

93.0

8*

100. 0

1

93.0

9*

100.0

1

93.0

10*

100.0

2

86.0

11*

100. 0

2

86.0

12*

100.0

2

86.0

13*

100. 0

2

86.0

14*

100.0

2

86.0

* = Reversal
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Table 8
Student Impact on Contractor 8's Grade

Contractor 8

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

80.0

1

73.0

3

72.3

1

65.3

4

100.0

1

93.0

5

67.0

1

60. 0

6

100.0

0

100.0

7

90.0

1

83.0

8*

100.0

1

93.0

g*

100.0

1

93.0

10*

80.0

2

66.0

11*

72.4

2

58.4

12*

100.0

3

79.0

13*

100.0

1

93.0

14*

100.0

1

93.0

* = Reversal
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Table 9
Student Impact on Contractor 9's Grade

Contractor 9

Week

Grade

Students
Below 72%

Adjusted
Grade

2

100.0

0

100.0

3

100,0

0

100.0

4

100.0

0

100. 0

5

100.0

0

100.0

6

100.0

0

100.0

7

100.0

0

100.0

8*

100.0

2

86.0

9*

100.0

0

100. 0

10*

100.0

1

93.0

11*

100.0

1

93.0

12*

100.0

1

93.0

13*

100.0

0

100.0

14*

100.0

0

100.0

* = Reversal
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Center for the Self-Management of Academic Performance
Phone Logs
Your Name __________________________________
Week Number _________
Student
Name

Date

Student1s
Signature
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General Observation and Communication Log

Date
Regard
ing
From
Student's signature
Date
Regard
ing
From
Student's signature
Date
Regard
ing
From
Student's signature
Date
Regard
ing
From
Student's signature
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CENTER FOR THE SELF-MANAGEMENT OF ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE
Special Procedure Policies
This course is designed to give you experience at designing
procedures that will help your students perform better.
In
addition to your regular responsibilities as a contractor,
there are activities that you will be required to engage
in. You are not limited, however, to the options that are
listed below. You may implement strategies to help a stu
dent that you think of.
Presently, you can earn 100 points for engaging in your
regular activities as contractor. Eventually, you will be
required to earn an additional 25 points, bringing your
total weekly points possible to 125.
In order to gain
credit for vour additional efforts, you are required to
record them on either the aeneral-loa or the phone lo g . In
other words, activities that you record on paper or that
you report verbally will not be counted.
Some activities require more effort than others or are more
valuable to the students. Therefore, each activity is
associated with a point value. You need not implement the
same procedure every week but the points you earn in the
special activities section should equal 25 points.
You may earn points for activities in which you are not
directly implementing a procedure to help a student. These
activities are termed "Preliminary Activities". Typically
these activities will not earn you as many points as you
would earn by actually implementing a program to help a
student, but doing preliminary work to solve a student's
performance problem may be a good start on implementing a
successful program. Activities associated with the highest
point values will be described under the heading "Interven
tions" .
Your general-logs and/or your phone logs must be submitted
to the program director or the contracting supervisor on
Fridays by 3:00 p.m. if you are to earn credit. Late sub
missions will not be accepted. And finally, note that you
will not earn credit for activities requiring the student's
signature or the program director's signature if you do not
have them.
Preliminary Activities
Data Analysis
Often contractors are not aware of the overall performance
of their students.
A student may, for example, attend the
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contracting sessions regularly, giving the contractor the
impression that he or she is passing the course. However,
the student may not be attending the student center regu
larly and is therefore not passing the course. So obviously
it would be a necessary prerequisite for the contractor to
keep accurate and updated records of how each of their
students is performing before designing an intervention
strategy.
Description of Activity
Data analysis will refer to the making of graphs for the
particular student(s) whose performance you are interested
in improving. In addition, your analysis what is causing
the student's performance problem must be provided.
Requirements
A.

Data must be plotted on

B.

Data must be current.

standard graph paper.

C. One paragraph summary of your impressions of what is
causing the performance problem must be provided.
D. The making of the graph and the
writing of the
summary must be recorded on your general-log.
Meeting With the Program Director or Contracting Supervisor
Occasionally, your interventions will be be successful,
no
matter how hard you try.
In this instance, you will need
to get some other suggestions from the program director or
contracting supervisor for possible interventions,
you can
earn special project points for this activity.
Description of Activity
Meeting attended with program director or contracting
supervisor to discuss ways to improve the performance of
the student(s) you supervise.
Requirements
A. Meeting must last at least one half hour.
B. Accurate and current graphs of student performance
must be presented.
C. A one paragraph description of potential causes of
student performance is presented.
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D. One paragraph outline of interventions already tried
must be presented.
E. One page outline of new intervention strategies.
F. The meeting must be recorded on your general-log.
Research on Problem Obtained
There may be instances in which the problem you encounter
is either so complex or so unique that getting additional
research on the topic may be useful.
Description of Activity
Obtaining research articles from the library relevant to
the specific problem.
Requirements
A. At least two articles must be obtained.
B. Each article must be at least 3 pages in length.
C. The setting and the subjects must be relevant to the
clients in the self-management center.
D. You must write a one half page summary of each article.
E. The activity must be recorded on your general-log
Help Student Solve Personal Problems
Description of Activity
There may be instances in which a student is having per
sonal problems (e.gs. financial problems, emotional pro
blems) that are interfering with their attainment of aca
demic objectives. You can earn points in the special proce
dures section for assisting students with these types of
problems.
Description of Activity
Refer students to appropriate agencies on campus.
Requirements
A. You must specify the agency that you refer the student
to.
B. Student attendance to the agency must be verified.
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C. You must recorded your activity on general-log.
D. Student must sign general-log with respect to this
activity.
IMPLEMENTATIONS
Phone Calls to Students
An effective way to improve the performance of students who
are performing poorly is to make phone calls to them. This
procedure helps students realize that their performance is
being monitored.
Description of Activity
Phone calls made to students. (Note that you will earn
credit Only for those phone calls in which you able to
contact the student.)
Requirements
A. Student Contacted
B. Call Recorded on Phone Log
C. Student Signs Phone Log
Home Visits to Students
There may be instances in which a student cannot be con
tacted by phone or that the phone calls were not effective
in improving the students attendanceto theself-management
center. In these cases, a visit to thestudent's
home may
be appropriate.
Description of Activity
Contractor goes to student house in an attempt to improve
the students attendance to the study center.
Requirements
A . Student Contacted.
B. Home visit is relevant to performance in self-management
center.
C. Activity recorded on General-log
D. Student signs general-log.
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Help Student With Homework
There may be instances in which you are able to help a
student in a class in which you have experience.
In this
instance, you can earn points for helping a student with
their homework.
Description Of Activity
Meeting between student and contractor specifically de
signed to help student in a class.
Requirements
A. Class Specified.
B. Study Objectives Specified.
C. Accomplishments Specified.
D. Meeting at least 1 hour.
E. Activity recorded on general-log.
F. Student signs general-log.
Letter Mailed to Student
Mailing a letter to a student who is not attending the
study center is often a good way to get them to attend.
Description of Activity
Letter mailed
Requirements
A. Letter approved by program director or contracting
supervisor
B. Letter mailed.
C. Activity Recorded on General-log.
D. Student or program director signs general-log.
Students Referred to Academic Skills Programs
Their may be instances in which a students is meeting the
objectives of the self-management center, but is still not
performing well in their other courses.
In this instance,
it may be appropriate to refer them to other programs on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

120

campus.
Description of Activity
Students referred to other academic programs on campus.
Requirements
A. Program student is referred to recorded.
B. Verification of student attendance obtained.
C. Activity recorded on general-log.
D. Student signs general-log.
Student Reports Daily Objectives
Possibly the most effective way to improve a student's
performance is to have the student report to you what they
plan to accomplish each day and also tc show you verifica
tion of their accomplishments.
Description of Activity
Record the daily activities the student engages in and
record the accomplishments they produced.
Requirements
A. Listing of daily accomplishments.
B. Verification of daily accomplishments checked.
C. Four days worth of daily accomplishments.
D. Activity reported on general-log.
E. Student signs general-log.
Student reminded of Obligations in Novel Setting
Sometimes it is difficult to contact students by either
phone or through home visits.
But in some instances, you
come in contact with students in novel settings, such as
the student union, on the way to class and so forth. You
can earn credit in this course for reminding the student of
their obligations in these settings.
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Description of Activity
students is told of obligation in setting other than the
self-management center or at home.
Requirements
A. Student is contacted.
B. Students comes to self-management center.
C. Activity is recorded on general-log.
D. Student signs General-log .
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CENTER FOR THE SELF-MANAGEMENT OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Special Procedures Outline
ACTIVITY

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

POINTS: 15

Point Breakdown
Data Analysis

ACTIVITY

a. Plotted on graph
paper
b. Data Current
c. 1 paragraph summary
d. Recorded on General
log

REQUIREMENTS

3
5
5
2

TOTAL

POINTS: 15

Point Breakdown

Meeting with
Program Director
Or Contracting
Supervisor

ACTIVITY

a.
b.
c.
d.

1 hour meeting
Graphs presented
1 page summary
1 page summary of
interventions already
tried
e. New intervention strategies
f. Data recorded on general-log

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

1
1
1
2
3
5
2

POINTS: 25

Point Breakdown
Research Obtained

a.
b.
c.
d.

Two articles obtained
Articles 3 pages
Articles specific to problem
Half page summary of each
article
e. Activity recorded on general
log

10
1
5
7
2
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ACTIVITY

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

POINTS: 20

Point Breakdown

Students referred
to other agencies
for personal
problems

ACTIVITY

a. specify agency
b. Attendance verified
c. Activity recorded on
general-log
d. Student signs general
log

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

1
15
2
2

POINTS: 20

Point Breakdown
Phone calls to
Students

ACTIVITY

a. Student contacted
b. Calls recorded on phone
log
c. Student signs phone log

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

10
2
2

POINTS: 25

Point Breakdown
Home Visits

a. Student contacted
b.

Home visit has academic
relevance
c. visit recorded on general
log
d. Student signs general-log

20
1
2
2
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ACTIVITY

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

POINTS: 25

Point Breakdown
Assist Student
With Homework

ACTIVITY

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Class specified
2
Study objectives specified
3
Accomplishments specified
4
Meeting lasts 1 hour
12
Activity recorded on general 2
log
f. Student signs general-log
2

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

POINTS: 20

Point Breakdown
Letter Mailed
To Student

ACTIVITY

a.
b.
c.
c.

Letter mailed
Letter approved
Activity recorded
Student or program director
signs general-log

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

14
2
2
2

POINTS: 10

Point Breakdown
Student Referred
Academic Skills
Programs

a. Program student is referred
recorded
b. Verification of student
attendance obtained
c. Activity recorded on general
log
d. Student signs general-log

2
4
2
2
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ACTIVITY

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

POINTS: 25

Point Breakdown
Daily Objectives
Reported

ACTIVITY

a. List student daily
accomplishments
b. Verification checked
c. Four days of daily
contracting
d. Activity recorded on
general-log
e. Student signs daily
log

REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL

4
10
7
2
2

POINTS: 15

Point Breakdown
Student Reminded
Of Obligations

a. Student contacted
b. Student attends
self-management center
c. Activity recorded on
general-log

11
2
2
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Informed Concent
I, ________________________ _ _ _ _ _____

•

have agreed to

participate in a study to evaluate the effects of an
accountability on staff performance. I understnad that a
portion of my grade will be based on the grades of the
students I supervise during one experimental condition. I
understand further that no data for publication or pre
sentation will be associated with my name, and, moreover,
that I have the opportunity, upon written request, to
withdraw from the study at anytime, at which time I will
be in the accountability condition.

Contractor's Signature ______________________

Experimenter's Signature ____________________
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